Nico Rausch, 2008 

          The role of media in transition to democracy is discussed various times. Generally scholars agree that media plays a role next to other factors like parliaments, executives, political parties and elections. There are various different opinions about the importance of this role. Generally we must see media in the context of civil society.

A strong civil society can help transitions get started, resist reversals, help to push transitions to their completion, help consolidate and help to deepen the democracy“... “Interests and values of civil society are the major generators of political society” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 9).

          The dimension of civil society includes the idea that free mass media is a very important factor in this arena, to give the civil society and their actors the possibility to mobilize an opposition against old structures and regimes and articulate their needs. Mass media is the main institution of public sphere and a functioning public sphere is a necessary condition for the civil society and democracy. It is also a useful and necessary contribution to the explanations of the transformation of societies. Media ideally contribute to the public sphere by providing citizens with information about the country and the world they live in, as well as debating important issues or encouraging actions.

          The role of the media is crucial especially in Eastern and Central European countries. Political parties are relatively weak and media is an important mediator between state elites and citizens. Media can therefore fill important gaps in social and political communication and become a powerful factor of consolidation of democracy. But this is not the only way media can work. The cases of Eastern and Central European states after the breakdown of the Soviet Union show in particular, that media can also slow down the process of democratization. This happened on the one hand through new totalitarian regimes, which tend to use media as an instrument of propaganda and on the other hand through ownership concentration in the hands of pro-regime forces or political elites. Democratic improvement cannot be expected in those cases.

          In authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes media can be privately owned and independent, as far as they do not touch political issues. In both, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, we find strict censorship and repressions against journalists and control over information. The media has, as far as it concerns politics, the role of a witness or a confirmer.

          Despite this specific concern about the role of media, we can say that freedom of expression (press) is essential for democracy. Without such basic freedom societies cannot move from undemocratic to democratic regimes. In their empirical analysis McConnell & Becker (2002) pointed out several questions, which are important in the scientific discussion about the role of media in democratization. The first is about if media plays any role. The vast amount of literature about media and democracy is answer enough to deny this idea. Another crucial dispute is whether media is an indicant for democratic reforms or not. Does media lead or follow? Does media affect or not? As well as the question, if media is beneficial or not? There cannot be only one answer. The answer the authors give is more complex.

          The role of media for democratic consolidation has to be seen as a process like democratization itself. Media is a component of transition, which happens in stages (not linear) and can be interrupted as well. In this context we could answer all questions above with yes and no. The main stages the authors examine, in combination with democratization theories, are pre-transition, transition, consolidation and mature. In the first phase the regime type matter. They consider both non-democratic regime-types described above and the role of the media as a witness.

          After the regime change, the transition stage starts. New media sources appear. New power elites try to gain influence over media, to gain strengths of voice and use media for legitimacy and support. Established sources start to remake themselves.

          The media now has to meet its new role in socialization, democratic education, fair political information and normalizing tolerance between different political views. The latter two stages are described by a vast amount of literature but are not taken into consideration in this paper.

          This short but fresh analysis of media and its role in democratization will background the following article about Ukraine’s media in democratization. As it will show, all above discussed factors matter in the Ukrainian case. Development of media freedom in Ukraine, analysis of various different indices, like Freedomhouse- Freedom of the Press, Freedomhouse- Nations in Transit/ Independent Media, Reporters Without Borders (RWB)- Country Ranking, IREX- Media Sustainability Index, play important role in this dicussion.

          These indices (except NIT) come to the same conclusions even if they use different approaches. Freedomhouse and RWB ratings are empirically quite similar but critics about an overall American influence over Freedomhouse lead me to use both of them. There are more media freedom measurements but the above-mentioned correlate in their results and are broad enough to analyse the situation in Ukraine.

          The questions, if media was beneficial for democratic change or not, will be crucial as well as if media does have affects (every time). Together, we will start with describtion of the regime change (Orange Revolution) with the major focus on the media. Was it supportive or not? Did the media lead or follow? Also major outcomes for the media after the Orange Revolution and the future prospects on its role for democratization.

Development of Media Freedom in Ukraine

          Different than a majority of authors I will highlight the whole development of media freedom and not only the time under Leonid Kuchma.

          Following the idea that media and its role has to be seen as a process within democratic development, it is worth looking at the years before Kuchma gained power. This period of time has also its impact on the later development of the media in Ukraine, as I will show. Therefore I will speak about four different phases: Pre-Kuchma, Kuchma’s first term as president, late Kuchma and after the Orange Revolution. The first three phases can be seen as the pre-transitional stage, described above and the latter one as the beginning of the transitional period. Ukraine’s democratic development do not reach so far any status of consolidated nor mature democracy therefore it is not fruitful to analyse here if the media meets its role in those stages. The development of Ukrainian media freedom and its role in transition is marked by two major factors- direct political influence and ownership structures. The legal environment had less significant influence under the Kuchma regime. Positive changes did not lead to more media freedom and laws were ignored or misused as well. Therefore I will highlight specifics of the system of political pressure and the ownership structure during the Kuchma period.

Pre-Kuchma- on the way to a hybrid model

          After the collapse of USSR and Ukrainian independence the media was relatively free. Beginning with glasnost we see in the early ninetes the abolishment of official censorship, the end of state monopoly over the media and a drop of barriers for the outside. From 1992 private ownership was legalized so that new media could emerge and a fast growth appeared. President Kravchuk paid little attention to mass media issues during this time, because he was more concerned with state and nation building. This period is called the golden era of Ukrainian media because state interference was almost absent. We can find high number of new newspapers, magazines and journals and radio and television stations start to exist legally. As it was almost normal for Eastern and Central European transition countries, there was an increase in press titles but a decrease of circulation, mainly because of economic reasons. The broadcast media started slower to grow and very little changed initially. The main failure of Kravchuk during his presidency was, that economic reforms were slow and privatization and liberalization were not done effectively, which also had an impact on the media (market). All major changes came with the new president Leonid Kuchma. Because of the relatively weak economic situation, the still prevalent Russian TV, the media could not emerge as a strong actor during the first years of independence as was therefore not beneficial for democratization. It was easy for Kravchuk’s successor to change the situation in his favour, which led to a hybrid model of media. A mixed situation of old communist features meeting capitalist, democratic ones. At this point it is also important to mention the change in behaviour of the existent political elite. Kuchma was not the first, trying to abuse Ukrainian media for his purposes. Kravchuk also tried to silence the opposition during the elections in 1994. He tried unsuccessfully to take oppositional media from the scene .

Kuchma’s first term

          Kuchma brought economic stabilization for Ukraine after being elected in an early vote 1994. Within his first years in office major changes were going on in the media landscape. Ukrainian ones replaced the Russian channels, which were still broadcasting. And most media have been eligible for state support and the first mass media laws were established. Due to economic stabilization also oligarchs emerged, which gradually invested money in media.

         We can see below (graphic 1/2) that media freedom started to decrease in 1997, after some improvement of early economic reforms and without state interference. Within the new media legislation in 1997, which granted support to media, we also have now more possibility of influence through the government. Editorial freedom is not guaranteed anymore. The law furthermore made all journalist civil servants, dependent on the state. On the one hand, the media law was an achievement, but on the other hand it has its negative. Dyczok (2006) points out, that also 1997 Kuchmas started to abuse its influence over the media to censor and discredit other politicians, like Moroz (Socialist). The main factors for the decrease in the further years were not the legal environment, which remained on the same level, but the stronger political influence and the economic pressure through concentrated ownership structure. Most of the broadcasting media was privatized in 1996 within broader economic reforms but the ownership was concentrated in the hand of a few oligarchs, which were close to president Kuchma. He therefore strengthened his control over the media directly and indirectly through owners of media from the same political group. Media was now dependent on political factions dominating the political sphere.

          Until the late 1990’s two owned all national broadcasting facilities of importance big oligarchic clans and the most popular newspapers owned by political parties or politicians. The most important media owner or influential shareholder was the Social Democratic Party United and the Kuchma family. INTER and 1+1 (private) belonged to SDPU (HRW 2003) as well as the newspapers “Den” and “Kievske Vedomosti”. The influence of Viktor Medvechuk is of importance, who later became the head of Kuchma’s presidential administration and very influential in controlling the media. Another SPDU figure (Surkis) owns an important local and regional channel in Kyiv. The Kuchma clan controlled furthermore ICTV, which was set with money of Olena Kuchma and her husband Viktor Pinchuk, Labour Party deputy, who also owned STB and New Channel and Channel 11 (Dnipropetrovsk). Pinchuk also controls the largest daily newspaper “Fakti i Komentarii” and the news service Ukraine News. The only not controlled media was the Internet. No concentration appeared. There is no single market leader among the providers. UT-1 remains the only state owned national channel.

          State and business started to fight information wars and since 1998 public officials started libel suits against journalist, which led to an increased sell-censorship.

          During the first period of Kuchma’s presidency we have to describe the media as not acting for a further democratization. The role of the media was not beneficial. Deregulation and privatization did not lead to an establishment of a more democratic media. There where the influence of the government decreased the oligarch’s interest took place, which mean also pressure on editorial freedom. There was also no opposition media left. Dyczok uses the term hybrid system to describe the media’s situation during this period. Mixed ownership structures and still soviet behaviour of abusing media for own interest, mainly through censorship and manipulation.

Graphic 1

(Own graphic- * the lower the score the more media freedom on a scale – 100 points. Source: Freedomhouse

0-30 = free, 31-60 partly free, 61-100= not free)

Graphic 2

(Own graphic - *1 is the best possible score and 7 the worst. Source: Freedomhouse/ NIT)

Graphic 3

(Own graphic - *lower scores indicate more media freedom. Source: RSF)

 Late Kuchma period- one of the Ten Worst Enemies of the Press

         As we can see in graphic 1 and 2 the level of media freedom decreased more heavily from 1999. This is caused through much stronger political influence on the media (see graphic 4). Kuchma prepared for new elections during this period and had to face decreasing popularity ratings. Therefore he decided to limit media criticism and deepened his censorship. Also oligarchs tried to maintain and increase their power against a growing opposition and increased criticism. Ukraine moved its status from a partly free country to a not free country within the Freedomhouse Index. The situation reached his negative eve in 2004 (graphic 1/2/3). From 1999- 2001 Kuchma was in the list of the 10 worst enemies of the press.

          After re-election of Kuchma the situation for the media in Ukraine got worse. In particularly we can see a rise in economic pressure and political influence through temnyki (graphic 4). The positive changes in the legal environment are mainly formal. Since 2001 libel is not longer a criminal offence, law as well as financial rewards in defamation cases prohibit censorship. Practically nothing changed. In 2003 we finally have the move to a not free country. The state censorship intensified even more and we can find a growth in economic pressure. The ruling party was covered favourably during the elections in 2002; the tax administration intensified its audits and physical threats on journalist increased. The situation in the first half of 2004 remained “stable”.

          The “highlights” of the late Kuchma period were several cases of journalist’s deeds, which reached international attention and increased pressure on his regime. Well known is the murder of the Internet journalist Gongadze in 2000. Another publisher was shot in 2001 and an independent television director killed. Freedomhouse (2002-2004 reports) mention the intensification of insults by the tax administration and security police as well as the use of temnyky. After Medvechuk (SPDU member) headed the presidential administration this state censorship increased heavily. Temnyky were first send to state and clan controlled channels and later wide spread to other media outlets. They consisted of clear advises how to deal with several issues (HRW 2003) Kuchma tried to control information as well as opinions which people should take over. The oppositional candidate Yushchenko almost disappeared from the mainstream media.

          The results of the 2002 elections, in which the pro regime parties lost, show a change in the role of media. Despite the heavy influence of the ruling political elite it seems that the control over the media had less or no affect. The semi authoritarian regime left place enough for certain media outlets to exist. Alternative information sources were always available like independent political newspapers of political parties or the Internet, which became more and more important especially after the Gongadze case. Even if there were several attempts to gain control over the Internet by the SBU it remained an important source of information and heavily used. The MS-Index shows increasing ratings after 2002 in all areas (graphic 5/6). Kuchmas lost in trust, the increasing number of dead journalist and direct pressure as well as the low trust in the media probably led journalist to think about their role. The professional journalism increased as well as the business management and the plurality. In this sense we can argue that the media started to lead and have affect. Dyczok speaks about a contemporary samizdat in the Internet. Among young people, mostly pro regime change, 15 per cent were using the Internet regularly and the most important pages are oppositional websites. After the tape scandal around president Kuchma, the use of the Internet as alternative source increased.

          To sum up we can see in the late Kuchma period two main factors considering the role of the media. On the one hand the state and oligarch controlled media lost its effectiveness on affecting people as the results of the 2002 and later 2004 elections show. On the other hand new alternative media forces began to act and have affect. That means the role of the media started to became more beneficial but the crucial changes came with the Orange Revolution.

Graphic 4

(Own graphic - *Higher numbers indicate less media freedom. The legal environment is scored on a 30-point scale, political environment on a 40-point scale, and economic environment on a 30-point scale. Despite this different maximum score I put all graphs in one diagram to show the development in general. Source: Freedomhouse)

          After the Orange Revolution

          After the Orange Revolution in 2004 we can see major changes in the case of media freedom (graphic 1/2/3), but Ukraine did not reach the level it had after the breakdown of Soviet Union or even the early Kuchma time (1994-1996- see graphic 1). We find only minor changes in economic pressure and legal environment, but also enormous positive change in politic influence (graphic 4). Ukraine moved from not free to partly free. After the election of Viktor Yushenko the temnyki policy stopped and direct interference of the presidential administration as well. Economic pressure remained almost the same even if we see ownership changes and new emerging media. Still many oligarchs are involved, who have close ties to the government. Also not all harassment of journalists stopped. The Media Sustainable Index highlights a positive development since 2002 even if the overall results support the above mentioned stages (graphic 5/6). The MSI is marked by what is described by Dyczok (2006) as the failure of Kuchma’s censorship. Or what we should characterize as the stage was media had no affect. Trust of the public in the media as well as in Kuchma was very low and even with his enormous influence on the media he lost two elections, 2002 parliamentary and 2004 his favourite candidate Yanukovich in the presidential elections. The MSI shows a growth in professional journalism, plurality and business management. New oppositional media appeared and journalists freed themselves from editorial and administrative pressure. Also Freedomhouse NIT report (2005/2006) highlight the positive role and the progress of independent media during the Orange Revolution and a genuine progress towards more pluralism. One of the major acknowledgements is that there are no crucial or fundamental changes, but a rather incremental process. We can argue that the media therefore had no leading role in transition but it was following and at least acting beneficial at the end of the pre-transitional phase.

          The Orange Revolution, which began because of massive election fraud during the second round of the presidential elections 2004 led hundreds of thousands of people on the streets. The victory of Viktor Yushchenko put Ukraine back on the democratic path. The transitional period started. Kuzio (2005) points out major improvements in civic empowerment and the political system. A parliamentary presidential system has more chances for a better democratic development. Also the media environment has been transformed. The SPDU lost its control over three television channels and other channels owned by Pinchuk’s holding became more balanced. The Internet as mentioned before received a major boost from the 2004 elections. Kuzio calls the Orange Revolution the world’s first “internet revolution”. Journalist work now in a free environment and do not have to fear arrests or violence. The public has now more trust in media and the trust in the most biased former SPDU station increased. Also the emergence of new media players during the Orange Revolution is beneficial for the role of the media. The oppositional channel; Channel 5 reached up to 25% audience in 2004. Channel 5 was not taking part in negative campaigning during the elections and was not taken off air . It also did not follow temnyky and Poroshenk, manager and owner, guaranteed editorial freedom. The opposition became another supporter in 2004. ERA TV also moved away from official censorship and its guidelines were quite oppositional.

          The more beneficial role of the media is connected with the growth of professional journalism and plurality and new business thoughts (MSI-graphic 5/6). The so-called journalist rebellions show a part of the media as acting force for more democracy. Channel UT-1 and 1+1 faced revolts of almost entire news teams, which refused to work under conditions of censorship and the oppositional Channel 5 fought with hunger strikes against its closure.

Graphic 5

Graphic 6

(* Own graphic – Unsustainable, Anti-Free Press (0-1): Country does not meet or only minimally meets objectives. Government and laws actively hinder free media development; professionalism is low, and media industry

          Activity is minimal. Unsustainable Mixed System (1-2): Country minimally meets objectives, with segments of the legal system and government opposed to a free media system. Evident progress in free-press

          Advocacy, increased professionalism, and new media businesses may be too recent to judge sustainability.

          Near Sustainability (2-3): Country has progressed in meeting multiple objectives, with legal norms, professionalism, and the business environment supportive of independent media. Advances have survived changes in government and have been codified in law and practice. However, more time may be needed to ensure that change is enduring and that increased professionalism and the media business environment are sustainable. Sustainable (3-4): Country has media that are considered generally professional, free, and sustainable, or to be approaching these objectives. Systems supporting independent media have survived multiple governments, economic fluctuations, and changes in public opinion or social conventions. Source: IREX MSI.)

          Conclusion

          Ukraine reached its transformation stage after a long time under semi authoritarianism characterized by Leonid Kuchma.

          The first 3 phases of media in the pre-transtional stage are marked from a move towards a more active and beneficial media. After not being active and therefore not beneficial during the presidency of Kravchuk the media became contra-beneficial for democratization under the first term of Kuchma. Ownership concentration and heavy censorship evolved in favour for the ruling regime. Professional journalism was low and the role of the media was non-acting. Due to decreasing trust and popularity and better media business the media got a chance to act more in favour for democracy. The ongoing pressure during the late Kuchma period engaged more independent journalists into the Internet, which became an important source of alternative information. But journalists had to pay a high price. Murders and harassments and continued pressure from state officials. But we can consider the late Kuchma time as awakening of a beneficial and acting media, which tend to affect the society more and more. As well as the contradiction, a less affective regime controlled media, which simultaneously lost trust in the society. With the Orange Revolution the media, like the society, acknowledged its role in the transition to democracy. Journalists played a great role in acting against the system and supporting a free democratic media. But the changes are not crucial yet. Ukraine still remains partly free. Despite some minor changes in legislation structural change is missing. We can see a partial redistribution of ownership but still state owned media and involvement of oligarchs. New mini oligarchs, which supported the Orange Revolution are now involved in the media business, like Poroshenko and Tymoshenko. The Donetsk clan is also trying to establish media outlets. Viktor Pinchuk is taking over temnyky policy for it economic interest as well as PR. Too many journalists are still close to the state, receive salaries or are party candidates. Dyczok claims that a public broadcasting system is needed to end state control and balance the information landscape.

          Olechowska (2006) also requires a media reform as a priority. There is still no transparent licensing system and politicians and their allies still buy and held media.

          There is still much to do to change media in Ukraine to make it more beneficial for consolidation of democracy. The start is done. People are better informed now, the Internet is established as an alternative news source and we can see an increasing professionalism in journalism. The media can now perform a more active role in promoting further democratic changes and strengthen the civil society. It should take a leading position now, not to let Ukraine fall back or stagnate during the difficult transitional phase.